Abstract-This paper presents a design and analysis methodology for detecting and isolating multiple sensor faults in heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) systems. The proposed methodology is developed in a distributed framework, considering a multizone HVAC system as a set of interconnected nonlinear subsystems. A dedicated local sensor fault diagnosis (LSFD) agent is designed for each subsystem, while it may exchange information with other LSFD agents. Distributed sensor fault detection is conducted using robust analytical redundancy relations of estimation-based residuals and adaptive thresholds. The distributed sensor fault isolation procedure is carried out by combining the decisions of the LSFD agents and applying a reasoning-based decision logic. The performance of the proposed methodology is analyzed with respect to robustness, sensor fault detectability, and isolability. Simulation results are used for illustrating the effectiveness of the proposed methodology applied to an eight-zone HVAC system.
I. INTRODUCTION

R
ECENT technological advancements in home automation have contributed to the design of the so-called smart buildings. A usually large scale and smart building can be viewed as a cyber-physical system [1] , which consists of the physical-engineered system (the conventional building) that is usually large scale and complex, and the cyber core, comprised of communication networks and computational means, designed to monitor, coordinate, and control the building environment to increase energy efficiency and cost effectiveness, improve comfort, productivity and safety, and increase system robustness and reliability [2] , [3] . One of the essential components of a smart building is the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system, which is responsible for providing a high quality and healthy environment for the building's occupants. The HVAC system is comprised a large number of electrical and mechanical components, including the heating and cooling plant (boilers, chillers, and dehumidifier), the ventilation system [variable air volume (VAV) terminal units and air handling unit (AHU)], and one or more zones served by the terminal units of the ventilation system. Each subsystem consists of several hardware components, such as sensors (e.g., temperature and humidity), electrical and mechanical actuators (e.g., coils, dampers, and valves), and controllers. Over time, it is inevitable that one or more HVAC components will fail, necessitating the utilization of a successful fault detection and isolation (FDI) mechanism [4] , [5] . Such a mechanism may be one of the enhanced functionalities of a smart building, while, according to [6] , it can save 10%-40% of the HVAC energy consumption.
During the last two decades, various methodologies have been developed for detecting and isolating faults in HVAC systems [7] - [10] . Most of these methodologies have focused on the detection and isolation of faults in actuators and the plant of the HVAC system. However, the detection and isolation of sensor faults are becoming a key challenging problem, since the number of sensors used for monitoring and control of the energy consumption and living conditions in large-scale smart buildings is increasing. For example, in the electromechanical part of the HVAC system, there may be sensors for measuring supply/return/mixed air temperature, supply/return air flow, differential pressure, return air humidity, and so on. Even in a single zone (e.g., room and corridor), there may be a temperature sensor, humidity sensor, CO 2 sensor, and an infrared occupancy sensor. Any fault in one or more of these sensors may have significant impact in the smooth operation of the HVAC system or even jeopardize the safety of the occupants. For example, a fault in the zone temperature sensor (stuck at a high temperature) can cause the continuous operation of the chiller, leading to both discomfort and increased energy consumption; or a fault in the CO 2 sensor can give the wrong signal to the controller for adjusting the air flow of the zone, leading to improper ventilation and unfavorable working conditions. HVAC sensor faults may also affect the functionality of supervision schemes [11] , executing safety critical tasks leading to wrong decisions and disorientation of remedial actions. For example, evacuation plans in case of contaminant release in a building are usually designed in combination with emergency control strategies for the HVAC system. These plans are activated based on measurements of contaminant and occupancy sensors [12] , e.g., aiming at making a zone to be a safe haven in case of contamination, the exhaust damper in the zone may be activated for directing the contaminant to another zone, where there are no people, according to the measurements of an occupancy sensor. However, a faulty contaminant sensor may indicate low or zero levels of contamination in the zone, leading to the nonactivation of the exhaust damper and characterization of the contaminated zone as safe. Or, the contaminant may be directed by the exhaust damper to a zone, which is indicated as empty, although it is occupied, due to a faulty occupancy sensor (stuck at zero).
Sensor FDI (SFDI) methods for HVAC systems can be classified into data-driven and model-based methods. Data-driven methods are the most commonly used for SFDI in HVAC systems, since they can be developed using a black-box model, without the requirement of understanding the system's model [13] - [18] . However, these methods need a plethora of data collected under both healthy and faulty conditions (data under faulty conditions are necessary for fault isolation), implying increased cost due to the utilization of redundant sensors beyond the sensors required for the proper system operation [19] . On the other hand, model-based methods require additional modeling and calibration effort, since a HVAC model with physical significance has to be developed using a priori knowledge of system process [20] - [23] . Nevertheless, the model-based SFDI methods are designed based on the data acquired by the sensors that are usually installed for feedback control purposes [24] - [27] .
The majority of the SFDI methods developed so far are based on a centralized approach, or have focused on the diagnosis of faults in one of the HVAC subsystems, e.g., chiller, AHU, and VAV, considering each subsystem separately [16] , [17] , [24] . HVAC systems are highly complex nonlinear systems, typically comprising multiple interconnected subsystems, especially in the case of large-scale buildings, such as hospitals, shopping malls, business centers, airports, universities, and many more. Thus, a centralized approach for fault diagnosis may be less suitable compared with a noncentralized approach, since it is characterized by: 1) increased computational complexity of the FDI algorithms, since centralized architectures are tailored to handle (multiple) faults globally; 2) increased communication requirements due to the transmission of information to a central point; 3) vulnerability to security threats, because the central cyber core in which the SFDI algorithm is implemented is a singlepoint of failure; and 4) reduced potential of scalability in case of system expansion (e.g., building a new ward in a hospital), due to the utilization of a global physical model or black box. Moreover, treating the occurrence of faults in a HVAC subsystem separately may be less efficient, since the propagation of faults in a distributed control architecture is neglected. Several researchers have developed decentralized or distributed techniques for diagnosing actuator, process, or sensor faults in specific classes of distributed interconnected nonlinear systems [28] - [34] . However, there are very few distributed techniques for diagnosing multiple sensor faults in HVAC systems [35] , which are likely to occur in large-scale buildings.
The objective and main contribution of this paper are the design and analysis of a distributed, model-based method for detecting and isolating multiple sensor faults affecting a multizone HVAC systems. Based on the nonlinear HVAC model developed in [23] and [36] , we develop a distributed SFDI methodology exploiting the spatial distribution of the HVAC system, i.e., modeling the HVAC system as a set of N + 1 interconnected nonlinear systems (N zones and the electromechanical part). For each nonlinear subsystem, we design a dedicated local sensor fault diagnosis (LSFD) agent, which is responsible for detecting and isolating the presence of sensor faults in a distributed manner. To this end, each LSFD agent uses the input and output measurements of its underlying subsystem, as well as the sensor measurements or reference signals of its neighboring subsystems. The sensor fault detection decision logic implemented in the agents relies on checking whether certain analytical redundancy relations (ARRs) are satisfied. The ARRs are formulated using estimation-based residuals and adaptive thresholds, considering bounded modeling uncertainties and measurement noise. The distributed isolation of multiple faulty sensors in the HVAC system is carried out using a diagnostic reasoning-based decision logic applied to a sensor fault signature matrix. The performance of the proposed methodology is analyzed with respect to sensor fault detectability and isolability [37] , characterizing under certain conditions the class of sensor faults that can be detected and isolated.
The added value of this particular case study is the design of a distributed isolation decision logic and its application to multizone HVAC systems that are inherently distributed systems, where the interconnected subsystems are characterized by heterogeneous nonlinear dynamics, as well as the analysis of the different ways that local and propagated sensor faults may affect each subsystem. Moreover, the utilization of adaptive thresholds ensures the robustness of the proposed method against modeling uncertainties and measurement noise, excluding false alarms that are not only annoying to the occupants but also deceptive in emergency situations. This paper is organized as follows. The HVAC system is described in Section II. The architecture and the design details of the proposed distributed SFDI methodology are presented in Section III. The HVAC sensor fault detectability and isolability are analyzed in Section IV. Simulation results of the application of the proposed SFDI architecture to an eight-zone HVAC system are provided in Section V, followed by concluding remarks in Section VI.
II. HVAC SYSTEM DESCRIPTION Consider a HVAC system, which consists of N separated zones (e.g., dormitory rooms and classrooms) and the electromechanical part. The basic components of the electromechanical part of the HVAC shown in Fig. 1 are the cooling coil, the chiller and the chilled water tank, the fan, the supply and return ducts, and the VAV boxes. The cooling coil is connected to the chiller through the chiller water tank, which regulates the water inserted to the cooling coil. The control inputs to the HVAC system are the air flow rate to each of the N zones (controlled through the fan and the VAV boxes) and the chilled water mass flow rate (controlled by a three-way valve). By controlling these inputs, the objective is to achieve the desired temperature in each building zone (for occupants' comfort) and in the cooling coil (for energy efficiency). The humidity and indoor air quality are not controlled.
The temperature dynamics in each zone, cooling coil, and chiller water tank can be modeled based on the fundamental mass and energy conservation equations under the following assumptions [23] , [36] : 1) the air temperature and velocity have uniform behavior throughout a zone; 2) the transient and spatial effects are neglected at the components that exchange air; 3) at the exterior and interior surface of the zones, supply/return ducts, and so on, the heat transfer is modeled using constant heat transfer coefficients; 4) the heat transfer at the chilled water tank with the ambient is modeled using a single constant heat transfer coefficient for all surfaces; and 5) the axial mixing of water is neglected and the water temperature is constant across the cross section of the tubes.
The temperature dynamic equations of the N-zone HVAC system are described by
where T z I (°C) is the temperature of the I th zone, I ∈ {1, . . . , N}, T ao (°C) is the output air temperature from the cooling coil, and T t (°C) is the temperature of the water in the chiller storage tank. The variable Q a I (m 3 /s) is the volumetric flow rate of air entering into the I th zone and χ (m 3 /s) is the chilled water mass flow rate. The variable T z I (°C/s) represents the rate of internal heat change, due to occupants and appliances from the I th zone. For the purposes of this paper, it is assumed that the ambient temperature T amb (°C) is constant and known. The remainder constant parameters of the HVAC system are the heat mass capacitance corresponding to the I th zone M z I (kg), specific heat at constant volume C v (J/kg · K), the overall heat transfer coefficients of the I th zone, the cooling coil, and the chilled water tank U z I , U cc , and U t (W/m 2 · K), respectively, the density of air and water ρ a and ρ w (kg/m 3 ), respectively, the area of the I th zone, the cooling coil, and the chilled water tank A z I , A cc , and A t (m 2 ), respectively, the specific heat at constant pressure of air and water C pa and C pw (J/kg · K), respectively, the latent heat of water h fg (J/kg), the temperature of output water T wo (°C), and the humidity factors w z and w ao [23] .
In each of the N zones, there exists a sensor measuring the zone temperature T z I , while two sensors are available in the electromechanical part of the HVAC, measuring the temperature of the air exiting the cooling coil T ao and the temperature of the chilled water in the tank T t . The control inputs to the N-zone HVAC system are the volumetric flow rate of air Q a I to each zone and the chilled water mass flow rate to the storage tank χ, generated by distributed feedback controllers based on some reference signals. The objective of this paper is to design a methodology for detecting and isolating multiple sensor faults that may affect the sensors used for monitoring and control of the N-zone HVAC system.
III. DISTRIBUTED HVAC SENSOR FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION
This section provides the design details of the distributed architecture for detection and isolation of sensor faults in the HVAC system described in Section II. The main step for employing the proposed distributed model-based sensor fault diagnosis methodology is to formulate the multizone HVAC system given in (1)-(3) as a set of interconnected nonlinear subsystems, where every local subsystem is described bẏ
where x ∈ R n and u ∈ R are the state and input vector of the local subsystem, respectively, while z ∈ R p and u z ∈ R z are the interconnection state and input vector, respectively containing the states and inputs of the neighboring, interconnected subsystems. The constant matrix A ∈ R n×n is the linearized part of the state equation and γ : R n × R → R n represents the known nonlinear dynamics. The term Ax + γ (x, u) represents the known local dynamics, while h : R n × R × R z × R p → R n represents the known interconnection dynamics. The last term η : R n × R × R z × R p × R → R n denotes the modeling uncertainty of the local subsystem, representing various sources of uncertainty, such as system disturbances, linearization error, uncertainty in the model's parameters, and so on. The input vector u is generated by a local feedback controller based a desired reference input.
A. Architecture
The N-zone HVAC system can be regarded as a set of N + 1 interconnected nonlinear subsystems that correspond to the electromechanical part, comprising the cooling coil and chiller water tank, and the N building zones. Let us
. By writing (2) and (3) in the form of (4) with x ≡ T e , u ≡ χ, z ≡ T z , and u z ≡ Q a , the subsystem that corresponds to the electromechanical part, denoted by e , can be expressed as
where
It is noted that the first two terms of (5) represent the local dynamics of e , while h e characterizes the interconnection dynamics between e and { (1) , . . . , (N) }, where (I ) corresponds to the temperature dynamics of the I th zone for all I ∈ {1, . . . , N}. By writing (1) in the form of (4) with
, and u z = 0, the subsystem of the I th zone can be expressed as
Again, the first two terms A (I ) T z I and γ (I ) (T z I , Q a I ) correspond to the local dynamics of (I ) , while h (I ) represents the interconnection dynamics between (I ) and e . The I th subsystem (I ) , I ∈ {1, . . . , N}, is monitored and controlled using a temperature sensor, denoted by S (I ) , characterized by the output
where d (I ) ∈ R denotes the noise corrupting the measurements y (I ) of sensor S (I ) and f (I ) ∈ R represents the possible sensor fault, i.e., the change in the I th output y (I ) due to a single fault in the I th sensor is described by
where β (I ) is the time profile and φ (I ) is the (unknown) function of the sensor fault that occurs at the (unknown) time instant t
f . The time profile of the fault is modeled as β (I ) (t) = 0 for t < 0 and β (I ) 
where k (I ) is the (unknown) evolution rate of the fault. In the case of abrupt sensor faults, the time profile of the fault is modeled by letting k (I ) → ∞. In practice, there may be more than one sensor covering a single zone (especially large zones). In this case, the multiple measurements can be combined by averaging or using advanced sensor fusion methods, while the proposed methodology can still be applied.
The nonlinear subsystem e is monitored and controlled using a sensor set S e that includes two temperature sensors S e {1} and S e {2}, characterized by
where y e j ∈ R, j = 1, 2, is the sensor output, d e j ∈ R denotes the noise corrupting the measurements of sensor S e { j }, and f e j ∈ R represents the possible sensor fault described by
where β e j is the time profile (the time profile β e j is modeled as β (I ) ) and φ e j is the (unknown) function of the sensor fault that occurs at the (unknown) time instant t e f j . Assuming the occurrence of sensor faults described by (13)- (16) allows us to test several time profiles (the time profile is the way that a fault evolves) and fault functions (the forms of the faults) that may vary for every subsystem.
The design of the proposed distributed SFDI technique is realized as follows. Considering the N +1 subsystems, defined through (5) and (10), the first step is to design a LSFD agent for each of the interconnected subsystems, i.e., the agent M e dedicated to subsystem e and the agent M (I ) dedicated to subsystem (I ) , I ∈ {1, . . . , N} [33] , [34] , [38] . Each LSFD agent has access to the input and output data of the underlying subsystem, while it may exchange information with some agents. The exchanged information is associated with the form of the physical and input interconnections. Particularly, the agent M e that monitors the electromechanical part transmits the measurements of S e {1} to each agent M (I ) , while it uses a priori known temperature reference signals of (I ) , I ∈ {1, . . . , N} from the agent M (I ) [39] .
The task of M e is to detect and isolate sensor faults affecting S e {1} and S e {2}. Assuming the occurrence of multiple sensor faults, two modules are designed in the agent M e such that the j th module, denoted by M e j is dedicated to the sensor S e { j }, j = 1, 2, and is responsible for isolating a sensor fault that affects S e { j }. The task of M (I ) is to isolate sensor faults in S (I ) . However, each agent M (I ) uses the sensor information y e 1 transmitted from M e , which may be faulty, thus affecting the decision of M (I ) , i.e., the agent M (I ) may not be able to distinguish between sensor faults in S (I ) and S e {1}. Therefore, the decision of the agent M e is transmitted to M (I ) upon request, after the time instant that M (I ) detects the presence of sensor faults [34] . The decision logic implemented in M e 1 , M e 2 , and M (I ) , I ∈ {1, . . . , N} relies on checking whether ARRs are satisfied, while every ARR is formulated using estimator-based residuals and adaptive thresholds. Considering (4), the structure of every estimator, designed for each agent/module, has the following general representation:
wherex ∈ R n is the estimation of x (withx(0) = 0) using the measurements y ∈ R m , L is the gain matrix chosen such that the matrix A − LC is stable, and z ∈ R p is comprised of a priori known reference signals or measurements of the interconnection variables z. The sensor output is described by
, where C ∈ R m×n is the output matrix, while d and f are the noise and fault vector, respectively, corrupting the sensor measurements. The estimator (18) is a special case of the Lipschitz observer designed in [33] and [34] , satisfying the corresponding assumptions, while the stability of the estimator (18) is ensured if the pair (A, C) is observable.
B. Residual Generation
The first stage of decision-making process conducted by the LSFD agents is the generation of residuals. Residuals are features that portray the status of the monitoring subsystem. Any unusual change in these features may imply the presence of faults. In this paper, residuals represent the deviations of the sensor data (observed behavior) from the estimated sensor outputs (expected behavior).
The nonlinear estimation model of the module M e 1 is selected as in (18) with y ≡ y e 1 , u ≡ χ, u z ≡ Q a , z ≡ T r , A ≡ A e , γ ≡ γ e , and h ≡ h e and defining T e 1 ≡ẋ
where T e 1 ∈ R 2 is the estimation of T e (using the measurements y e 1 ), with initial conditions T e 
Let us define the state estimation error ε e T 1
(t) = T e (t)− T e 1 (t); given (5), (15), and (19), the residual ε e y 1 under healthy conditions can be rewritten as
where y e 1 is the sensor measurement defined in (15) . According to (20) and (21), the residual ε e y 1 is affected only by a possible fault in the sensor S e {1}.
The estimator in the module M e 2 is structured as in (18) ∈ R, is expressed as
where y e 2 is the sensor measurement described by (16 
According to (23) and (24) , the residual ε e y 2 is affected only by a possible fault in the sensor S e {2}.
The nonlinear estimator implemented in the agent M (I ) , I ∈ {1, . . . , N} is structured as in (18) 
, and h ≡ h (I ) and defining (25) where
The residual generated by the agent M (I ) , I ∈ {1, . . . , N}, is denoted by ε (I ) y ∈ R and is described by ε (I )
Considering (10), (13) , and (25), the residual ε (I ) y , I ∈ {1, . . . , N} under healthy conditions can be expressed as
where y (I ) and y e 1 are sensor measurements described by (13) and (15), respectively. Based on (26) and (27) , the residual ε (I ) y is affected by possible faults in either sensor S e {1} or sensor S (I ) .
C. Computation of Adaptive Thresholds
Due to the presence of disturbances and sensor measurement noise, the observed behavior is typically not identical to the expected behavior even during the healthy operation of the sensors in the building zones and electromechanical part. For this reason, the residuals are compared with thresholds that are designed to bound the residuals under healthy conditions, ensuring the robustness of the agents M e and M (I ) , for all I , with respect to various sources of uncertainties. The adaptive thresholds designed in this paper are time-varying functions of measured or computable signals. The adaptive nature of the thresholds can contribute in reducing the conservativeness in the decision making compared with fixed thresholds. The adaptive thresholds are computed considering the following assumption.
Assumption 1: The modeling uncertainty of (I ) , I ∈ {1, . . . , N} and the measurement noise of each sensor S (I ) and S e { j }, j = 1, 2 are unknown but uniformly bounded, i.e., |η (I ) 
where ε (I ) y (t) is the residual under healthy conditions ( f (I ) = 0, I ∈ {1, . . . , N} and f e 1 = 0) defined in (27) . Hence, the adaptive threshold ε (I ) y (t) is described by
where T z I is a known bound such that |T z I (0)| ≤ T z I , ρ (I ) and ξ (I ) are positive constants such that |e
It is noted that the adaptive thresholds defined in (29), (31) , and (33) 
where 
D. Distributed SFDI Decision Logic
This section presents the decision-making process realized by the agent M e and its modules M e 1 and M e 2 , and the agent M (I ) , I ∈ {1, . . . , N} for detecting and isolating multiple sensor faults in a distributed manner. The decision logic relies on checking the satisfaction of a set of ARRs [41] - [43] . In this paper, the ARRs are dynamical constraints, formulated using the residuals and adaptive thresholds. are defined in (20) , (23) and (29), (31) The sensor fault detection decision logic of the agent M (I ) , I ∈ {1, . . . , N} is based on the following ARR: 
where t If D (I,1) (t) = 1, then it is ensured that at least one of S (I ) and S e {1} is faulty.
2) Sensor Fault Isolation: In the context of smart buildings, it is important not only to be able to detect the occurrence of sensor faults but also to be able to isolate the location of the fault as soon as possible. Table I , all possible sensor fault combinations are isolable by the agent M e , since there are three distinct theoretical patterns.
Assuming the occurrence of multiple sensor faults, the decision of the agent M (I ) is combined with the decision of the agent M e . Specifically, when M (I ) detects the presence of sensor faults (D (I,1) (t) = 1), it requests from M e to transmit its decision D e 1 on whether the sensor S e {1} is faulty to isolate a sensor fault affecting S (I ) . The reason for the combinatorial process of the decisions is that the agent M (I ) uses the measurements of sensor S e 1 for the generation of the residual and adaptive threshold as well as the formulation of the ARR E (I ) . Hence, the distributed sensor fault isolation is conducted by comparing the observed pattern of sensor faults, defined as D (I ) 
(t) = [D (I,1) (t), D e
1 (t)] to the columns of the sensor fault signature matrix F (I ) , I ∈ {1, . . . , N}, presented in Table II . The rows of F (I ) correspond to the ARRs E (I ) and E e 1 , while the columns correspond the three possible combinations of sensor fault occurrence, i.e., F (I ) :
where I e D (t) = {i : F e i = D e (t), i ∈ {1, 2, 3}}. The decision of the agent M (I ) , I ∈ {1, . . . , N}, relies on the diagnosis set D (I )
21 = * is consistent to either 0 or 1. Remark 3.1: The proposed sensor fault diagnosis methodology has been developed by applying a dedicated scheme with multiple observers, where each observer of an agent/module is driven by a single sensor (like in M e 1 and M e 2 ) or a set of one local sensor and one sensor in the neighboring subsystem (as the observer in M (I ) for all I ). The isolation decision logic relies on the fact that the agents/modules are characterized by: 1) robustness, i.e., the agents are insensitive to modeling uncertainties and measurement noise under healthy conditions and 2) structural fault sensitivity, implying that the agents/modules are sensitive to subsets of sensor faults. Particularly, the agent M (I ) is designed to be structurally sensitive to sensor faults f (I ) , respectively. The residuals are generated using an observer driven by a set of sensors, while the adaptive thresholds are designed to bound the residual under healthy conditions. Therefore, when the magnitude of a residual exceeds the corresponding adaptive threshold, this sensor set is isolated as faulty. An alternative decision logic for isolating sensor faults is to infer that there are faults in a specific sensor set, when the magnitudes of all residuals generated by the observer, which is not driven by this specific sensor set, do not exceed the corresponding thresholds [44] . This decision logic is applied to a generalized scheme of multiple observers or an unknown input observer (UIO) scheme [45] , [46] . In the case of multiple sensor faults, the number of observers in a dedicated scheme may be less than the number of observers in a generalized or UIO scheme.
IV. HVAC SENSOR FAULT DETECTABILITY AND ISOLABILITY
The objective of this section is to analyze the performance of the proposed distributed SFDI methodology with respect to the sensor fault detectability and isolability of the agents M e and M (I ) , I ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Specifically, certain conditions are derived, under which we characterize the class of sensor faults affecting S e , S (I ) , I ∈ {1, . . . , N} that can be detected and isolated. It is important to note that the class of detectable/isolable sensor faults satisfying these conditions is obtained under worst-case assumptions, in the sense that they are valid for any modeling uncertainty and measurement noise satisfying Assumption 1. It is noted that in practice, the modeling uncertainty and measurement noise may not reach the limit (worst case) of Assumption 1.
A. Electromechanical Sensor Fault Isolability Conditions
The conditions for guaranteeing the isolation of sensor faults f 
For 
By adding and subtracting the integral 
Considering (28) and (51) 
given that w(t * ) = 0, the module M e 1 is guaranteed to isolate sensor fault f e 1 . Similarly, if f e 2 is constant, i.e., f e 2 = θ e 2 , and at some time instant t * , the constant sensor fault θ 
2 is guaranteed to isolate sensor fault f e 2 . Considering (58) and (60), we can derive valuable intuition for the minimum isolable magnitude of sensor fault θ e j , j = 1, 2, with respect to the bound of sensor noise d e j , and the selected design parameters used for the implementation of the estimator in the module M e j (e.g., L e j ) and the adaptive thresholds (ρ e j , ξ e j ).
B. Building Zone Sensor Fault Detectability and Isolability Conditions
The conditions for ensuring the detection/isolation of f (I ) 
: the occurrence of a fault in the temperature sensor of the I th zone S (I ) is guaranteed to be isolated under worst-case conditions, if there exists a time instant t * ∈ [t
) such that the sensor fault f (I ) satisfies the condition
where ε (I ) y (t) is the adaptive threshold, generated by the agent M (I ) . 2) Let t e f 1 
< t (I )
f : the occurrence of a fault in the temperature sensor of the cooling coil S e {1} is guaranteed to be detected under worst-case conditions, if there exists a time instant t * ∈ [t e f 1 
, t (I )
f ) such that the sensor fault f e 1 satisfies the condition
3) The occurrence of faults in the temperature sensors S (I ) and S e {1} is guaranteed to be detected under worst-case conditions, if there exists a time instant t * ≥ max(t
Proof: 1) Assume that no fault affects S (I ) , I ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and S e {1}, i.e., f (I ) = f e 1 = 0; based on (10) and (25), the state estimation error of the agent
For t ≥ t
y is expressed as
After some algebraic manipulation and using (64), it yields
where ε (I ) y H (t) corresponds to the residual under healthy conditions described by (27) , and ε (I ) y F (t) describes the effects of sensor fault f (I ) on the residual ε (I ) y and defined as
Considering (32) and (66), it yields
If there exists a time instant t * such that the effects of sensor fault f (I ) on the residual ε (I ) y satisfy the condition |ε
y (t * ), implying that (61) is valid, then, using (68), this entails that |ε
y (t * ), leading to the isolation of sensor fault f (I ) .
2) Part 2 of Lemma 4.2 can be proved in a similar way to part 1.
3) For t ≥ t e f 1
> t (I )
f , the residual ε (I ) y is expressed as
The term ε (I )
) is determined through the following equation:
Using (64) and (70) and after some algebraic manipulation, the effects of sensor faults f (I ) and f e 1 for t ≥ t e f 1 
f are described as
y (t * ), implying that (63) is valid, then, using (68) and (71), it is implied that |ε Using Lemma 4.2, we may characterize the class of sensor faults f (I ) and f e 1 that are detectable/isolable by the agent M (I ) with respect to the bounds of modeling uncertainty and measurement noise, as well as the selected design parameters used for the implementation of the estimator of M (I ) (e.g., L (I ) ) and the adaptive thresholds (ρ (I ) , ξ (I ) ). During the design, we can simulate various types of faults, i.e., various fault functions and profiles, which may affect a single sensor, and seek the minimum fault magnitude that satisfies the sensor fault detectability/isolability conditions. This analysis can be performed offline for calibrating the design parameters before the real-time implementation of the proposed agents.
Comparing (61) 12 . Based on (61) and (62) and assuming constant sensor faults, we may determine the minimum magnitude of sensor faults f (I ) and f e 1 that are detectable/isolable by the agent M (I ) in a similar way as in (58) and (60).
For the modules M e 1 and M e 2 of the agent M e , the detectability analysis is equivalent to the isolability analysis, since each module is dedicated to monitor the status of a single sensor, leading to the sensor fault signature matrix presented in Table I . Thus, in Lemma 4.1, we characterize the minimum effects of sensor faults f e 1 (t) and f e 2 (t) that will be isolable by the modules M e 1 and M e 2 , respectively, by provoking the violation of E e 1 and E e 2 , respectively. In the case of the agent M (I ) , we distinguish the case of a single sensor fault occurrence and the occurrence of two sensor faults. In the first case, we characterize the minimum effects of a local sensor fault ( f (I ) ) or a propagated sensor fault ( f e 1 ) that are guaranteed to provoke the violation of the ARR E (I ) of the agent M (I ) in conjunction with the sensor fault signature matrix presented in Table II . In the second case, we characterize the minimum effects of both local and propagated sensor faults that are guaranteed to be detectable by the agent M (I ) .
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
The objective of this section is to illustrate the application of the proposed distributed SFDI method applied to the class of HVAC systems described in Section II consisting of eight zones (N = 8) [23] . The operation of the HVAC system is simulated based on (5)- (12) . The dimensions of each zone are 3.5 m × 1.75 m × 2 m. The parameters used for the simulation of e described by (5)- (9) are: Eight feedback linearization controllers [47] were implemented, where each controller is responsible for keeping the temperature of each zone at 24°C. A backstepping controller [48] was applied for maintaining the temperature of the output air of the cooling coil at 10°C. It is noted that every zone temperature controller uses the measurements of the temperature of the cooling coil, while the controller of the electromechanical part uses the a priori known set points of the temperature of the zones, as well as the air flow rate (control input) of every zone. Based on Section III, we design nine agents, one for the electromechanical part and eight for the zones, while the agent of the electromechanical part consists of two modules. The estimators of the agents are structured as in (19) , (22) , and (25) with estimator gains
and L e 2 = 3. The adaptive thresholds of the agents, defined in (29) , (31) , and (33) , are designed using the following parameters: ρ e 1 = 1, ξ e 1 = 4, ρ e 2 = 1, ξ e 2 = 3 ρ (I ) = 1, and ξ (I ) = 3. We have considered two multiple sensor fault scenarios: in the first scenario, the sensors of the electromechanical subsystem and zones 3-6 are affected by faults, while in the second scenario, the sensors in all building zones become faulty. In all scenarios, the sensor faults are abrupt with time varying fault functions, i.e., φ e 1 (t) = 15%Y e 1 + 0.5sin(0.01t), φ e 2 (t) = 15%Y e 2 + 0.5sin(0.01t) and 
f = 6000 s, and t (8) f = 6500 s. Note that the considered amounts of uncertainty and fault functions were chosen such that the isolation of sensor faults is guaranteed, because the goal of this example is to illustrate the proposed distributed sensor fault isolation decision logic.
The results of the application of the distributed SFDI method to the HVAC system are shown in Figs. 2-5 Fig. 2(a) and (b) , respectively, to the columns of fault signature matrix F e shown in Table I , the agent M e isolates the sensor faults initially in the cooling coil and then in the chilled water tank, based on the following diagnosis set: for t ≥ 2500. It is noted that the effects of the sensor fault in the cooling coil on the residuals and thresholds of the eight agents that monitor the building zones are low and are not detectable by these agents [ Fig. 2(c)-(j) ]. The distinct effects of local sensor fault ( f (I ) ) and propagated sensor fault ( f e 1 ), which are analyzed in Section IV-B, can be observed through the simulation results presented in Fig. 2(c)-(j) . Based on Fig. 2(c)-(j) , the agents M (1) , M (2) , M (7) , and M (8) do not detect the presence of the faulty temperature sensor in the cooling coil, although they use its measurements. These agents do not also detect the occurrence of sensor faults in the building zones 3-6, but this is due to the fact that every agent M (I ) is sensitive to faults f (I ) and f e 1 and not to fault f (Q) , Q = I .
Each of the agents M (3) -M (6) detects the presence of sensor faults just after the consecutive occurrence of the sensor fault in each monitoring building zone, as shown in Fig. 2(e)-( (3, 1) , D (4, 1) , D (5, 1) , and D (6, 1) is shown in Fig. 2(a) and (e)-(h) to the columns of the sensor fault signature matrix F (I ) shown in Table II . Given that D (I ) (t) = [1, 1] for all I ∈ {3, 4, 5, 6}, the resultant diagnosis set is D faults but also isolates the sensor fault in the I th building zone. This is realized in conjunction with the decision of the module M e 1 [ Fig. 2(a) ]. In other words, all monitoring agents M (1) -M (8) can isolate in a distributed manner the consecutive occurrence of multiple sensor faults in all zones [ Fig. 3(c)-(j) ]. Particularly, when the agent M (I ) detects sensor faults, the observed pattern is equal to the D (I ) (t) = [1, 0] , which is consistent with the first column of the sensor fault signature matrix F (I ) shown in Table II , leading to the diagnosis set D (I ) s (t) = { f (I ) }. By comparing the simulation results shown in Fig. 3(c) -(j) with the simulation results in Fig. 2(c)-(j) , it can be stated that the effects of the propagated sensor fault f e 1 on the residuals and adaptive thresholds of M (1) -M (8) are much lower than the effects of the local sensor faults. Therefore, in the first sensor fault scenario, we may infer that the occurrence of the local fault f (I ) is more likely to have provoked the violation of E (I ) , I ∈ {3, 4, 5, 6}, than the single occurrence of the propagated sensor fault f e 1 , and characterize the sensor S (I ) as faulty for all I ∈ {3, 4, 5, 6} .
The effects of sensor faults on the actual temperature of the cooling coil, chilled water tank, and all building zones, as well as the temperature estimations derived by the modules M e 1 and M e 2 and agent M (I ) , I ∈ {1, . . . , 8} can be observed in Figs. 4 and 5. According to Fig. 4(a) , when the temperature sensor of the cooling coil becomes faulty, the backstepping controller perceives the positive fault variation in the sensor output as an increase in the temperature and generates chilled water flow rate aiming at decreasing the actual temperature of the cooling coil. In addition, due to this sensor fault, the estimation of the temperature in the cooling coil is faulty, i.e., different from the actual temperature. When the temperature sensor of the water tank becomes also faulty, based on Fig. 4(a) and (b) , the actual temperature in the chilled water tank is less influenced compared with the actual temperature of the cooling coil, while its estimation deviates from the actual temperature less than the estimation of the temperature in the cooling coil. The occurrence of the sensor faults in the cooling coil and the chilled water tank is not observable in the actual temperature of the zones and their estimations provided by the agents M (1) -M (8) 
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a model-based distributed architecture for multiple sensor fault detection and isolation (SFDI) in a multizone HVAC system. The HVAC system was modeled as a set of interconnected subsystems. For each subsystem, we designed a local sensor fault diagnosis (LSFD) agent, where every agent was dedicated to each of the interconnected subsystems. The distributed isolation of multiple sensor faults was conducted by combining the decisions of the LSFD agents and applying a reasoning-based decision logic. The performance of the proposed methodology was analyzed with respect to sensor fault detectability and multiple sensor fault isolability, characterizing the class of detectable and isolable sensor faults. The proposed SFDI technique may contribute to the reduction of energy consumption in large-scale buildings, as well as provide a procedure for the condition-base maintenance, thus reducing unnecessary maintenance work. Moreover, the distributed deployment of the LSFD agents enhances the reliability with respect to security threats, while it is scalable for handling additional building zones in large-scale buildings. Simulation results illustrated the effectiveness of the proposed distributed SFDI methodology in isolating multiple sensor faults in an eight-zone HVAC system.
Future research work will involve the integration of the proposed distributed methodology with other techniques for diagnosing both sensor and actuator faults in the HVAC system, aiming at resolving the problem of multiple sensor and actuator fault isolation, as well as the propagation of the sensor and actuator fault effects. The proposed methodology offers a framework for incorporating additional agents designed to be robust and structurally sensitive to subsets of actuator faults or some combinations of both sensor and actuator faults.
